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Since the early 1990s, regional trade agreements (RTAs) covering trade in services have 
proliferated, with 95 RTAs on services notified to the World Trade Organization (WTO) under 
Article V of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), as of June 2011. This 
paper discusses how RTAs support or debilitate the GATS in its governance function as the 
keeper of rules and liberalization commitments on services trade for WTO members. It 
addresses this question and its implications for governance by focusing on four different 
issues: architecture; compliance; ability to promote reforms; and actual impact of RTAs on 
fostering services trade. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The world of international trade experienced nothing less than an economic revolution in the 
1990s.  Numerous countries in the world undertook reforms aimed at dismantling 
protectionist measures in their own markets and at promoting a more open and dynamic 
pattern of integration into the world economy. In several countries, trade in services and 
investment rulemaking were at the forefront of the reforms being undertaken. It was felt that 
easing restrictions on foreign investment could foster economic growth and that removing 
barriers to trade in services could lead to lower prices, improved quality and greater variety 
of both goods and services, as well as stimulate exports. 
Until the 1990s, regional trade arrangements (RTAs) were few and very limited in scope, 
both in terms of the issues covered and the liberalization commitments envisaged. Most 
RTAs included limited coverage of trade in goods with no mention of trade in services, 
although there were three notable exceptions—the European Union (EU), the Australia-New 
Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement (ANZCERTA), and the Canada-
United States (US) Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA).
1
The European Economic Community (EEC) (which later became the European Community 
and has been the European Union [EU] since the  Maastricht Treaty in 1993), under the 
Treaty of Rome in 1957, was the first integration agreement to incorporate trade in services. 
The free movement of services alongside the freedom of establishment are essential for an 
effective functioning of the internal market. They guarantee EU service providers the right to 
establish themselves in any member state and the right to provide services cross-border on 
a temporary basis on the territory of the state different from the one where they are 
established. However, in practice, intra-EU trade in services is impeded by sectoral 
regulations and other protectionist barriers in most member states. 
 
ANZCERTA and CUSFTA were the first bilateral trade agreements  to include trade in 
services. While ANZCERTA came into force on 1 January 1983, the Trade in Services 
Protocol brought services into the agreement from January 1989, allowing most services to 
be traded free of restriction across the Tasman Sea. In the case of CUSFTA, which entered 
into force on 1 January 1989 and was superseded by the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) as of 1 January 1994, the agreement applied only to a list of covered 
services whereas services that were not covered were not subject to the obligations of the 
agreement. 
Since the early 1990s, RTAs covering trade in services have proliferated, with 95 RTAs 
(including 85 that are in force) notified to the World Trade Organization (WTO) under Article 
V of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), as of June 2011. This paper will 
attempt to address a number of questions raised by this proliferation. First, it provides an 
overview of the different trends in the world economy today involving regionalism, 
highlighting the proliferation of RTAs in services around the world, the political economy 
considerations in pursuing RTAs in services, and the convergence experiences of RTAs 
which are underway. It explains the possibilities for convergence of those RTAs with similar 
structure,  particularly in the Americas. The paper concludes by addressing governance 
issues related to RTAs in trade in services. It touches upon the governance problem created 
for the multilateral system by the widening gap between RTAs and the WTO GATS. 
                                                 
1 The US-Israel Free Trade Agreement, which entered into force on 1 September 1985, included a Declaration on 
Trade in Services. For more information, see http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/US-Israel/index_e.asp  ADBI Working Paper 307                                                Stephenson and Robert 
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2.  OVERVIEW OF DIFFERENT TRENDS IN THE WORLD 
ECONOMY TODAY INVOLVING REGIONALISM 
Since the mid-1990s, RTAs have proliferated, with almost 500 agreements notified to the 
WTO by June 2011.
2  Although RTAs covering trade in services are more recent, 
notifications for services agreements under GATS Article V have grown at a faster pace, as 
noted by Roy, Marchetti, and Lim (2009).
3 Key players, such as the US, the EU, and Japan, 
as well as other players
4 including several developing countries, have in the last decade 
signed several RTAs covering services with partners beyond their immediate neighborhood. 
The result is that countries that are parties to RTAs account for more than 80% of services 
trade even though, to date, the WTO still governs the services relations among large players 
(US, EU, Japan, the Republic of China [henceforth, PRC], India, and Brazil).
5
This section will discuss the key issues surrounding regionalism and trade in services: Why 
are RTAs proliferating? What are the political economy considerations in pursuing RTAs in 
services, and the convergence experiences of regional agreements underway?  
 
2.1  Proliferation of RTAs in services around the world 
The Americas 
More than any other region in the world, the Americas was the first to embrace regionalism 
wholeheartedly and has remained at the forefront in developing innovative approaches to the 
treatment of services trade. 
The crafters of the NAFTA in the early 1990s took a different path from the negotiators of the 
WTO GATS, though both agreements were being negotiated simultaneously. While political 
caution on the part of developing countries dictated a very timid approach to the structure of 
the GATS as well as the adoption of a “positive list” or gradual approach to the undertaking 
of market access commitments, the NAFTA negotiators took the opposite track of high 
ambition. Spurred by the active participation of the business community, they abandoned the 
CUSFTA model, which applied only to a list of covered services, where services that were 
not covered were not subject to the obligations of the agreement, to famously adopt the 
alternative “negative list” approach to market opening. Although often mistakenly understood 
as meaning a complete liberalization of service restrictions, in reality the “negative list” 
translated into an across-the-board legal assurance of access for service providers and 
investors at the level of existing regulations.  
The greatest achievement of this alternative approach developed in the Americas in terms of 
services and investment was to bring the main virtues of the GATT for trade in goods, 
namely transparency and the predictability of a rules-based system, to bear on services in a 
way that the WTO GATS structure and rules failed to do. This proved to be of great 
importance because over time, as countries began to perceive the numerous shortcomings 
of the GATS and its rigidities, the alternative offered by the NAFTA structure became 
increasingly attractive and its adherents increasingly numerous.  
Since the mid-1990s,  the countries of the Americas have been at the vanguard of the 
negotiation of NAFTA-type free trade agreements—they are characterized by their ambitious 
                                                 
2 As of June 2011, some 489 RTAs, counting goods and services notifications separately, had been notified to 
the GATT/WTO. Of these, 358 RTAs were notified under Article XXIV of the GATT 1947 or GATT 1994; 36 
under the Enabling Clause; and 95 under Article V of the GATS. At that same date, 297 agreements were in 
force. See http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm.  
3 See Roy, Marchetti, and Lim (2009). 
4 For example, Australia;  Chile;  the PRC;  Costa Rica;  Hong Kong, China; the Republic of Korea;  Malaysia; 
Mexico; New Zealand; Peru; Singapore; and Thailand.  
5 See Roy, Marchetti, and Lim (2009). ADBI Working Paper 307                                                Stephenson and Robert 
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nature and their objective of carrying out trade liberalization and integration not only for 
goods but also for services, as well as other key issues such as investment, intellectual 
property, and government procurement. Since the entry into force of the NAFTA, countries in 
the Western Hemisphere have negotiated and concluded no fewer than  30  sub-regional 
arrangements
6
Most countries in the Americas have embraced the comprehensive, negative-list approach of 
the NAFTA for services in their trade agreements negotiated with other partners in the 
region.
 among themselves containing disciplines on trade in services, either in the 
form of new RTAs or as part of an effort to deepen already-existing  regional economic 
integration groupings.  
7 Twelve countries stretching from Canada to Chile along the Pacific Coast, and the 
Dominican Republic, have negotiated similar-type RTAs using this approach. Moreover, the 
members of the Central American Common Market (CACM)
8 also chose the same approach 
in their services and investment agreement, whereas the members of the Andean 
Community
9 and those of CARICOM
10 each opted for a “negative-list” services agreement 
within their own separate integration process, though with a slightly different structure from 
that of NAFTA.  In South America,  the  members of the Common Market of the South 
(MERCOSUR)
11 chose a different model than the NAFTA and adopted the Protocol of 
Montevideo on Trade in Services in 1997, with the objective of achieving full liberalization of 
trade in services and an open regional market for services through periodic rounds of 
negotiations. Seven such rounds have already taken place. The Protocol of Montevideo, 
which entered into force on 7 December 2005, establishes a program for the liberalization of 
intra-trade in services within an overall implementation period of ten years from the date of 
entry into force, i.e., by December 2015. Although modeled after the “positive list” approach 
of the GATS, MERCOSUR countries have also innovated with respect to the WTO by 
agreeing in 2001 to a transparency exercise consisting of the listing of all existing restrictions 
in services trade with a view to their progressive removal. This transparency exercise is 
complemented by a “standstill” provision prohibiting the adoption of new restrictions.
12
                                                 
6 In addition to NAFTA, this number also includes the Bolivia-Mexico FTA, which was replaced in 2010 by an 
Economic Complementarity Agreement (ECA) between the two countries. The ECA does not have a services 
chapter. 
 It is 
7 For more information on the experience of Latin American countries in implementing the trade agreements they 
have signed with the US, see Robert (2011). 
8 The CACM members are: Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. 
9 The current members of the Andean Community are: Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. The liberalization 
of trade in services has been suspended in the Plurinational State  of Bolivia since December 2006, in 
accordance with Decision No. 659 of the Commission of the Andean Community (“Service Sectors Subject to 
Further Liberalization or Regulatory Harmonization”) of 14 December 2006. Decision No. 659 also provides 
that financial services and the further liberalization of the minimum percentages of nationally-produced 
programming on national free-to-air television will be subject to special treatment and will continue to be 
regulated by sectoral decisions on which, to date, the members of the Andean Community have not yet 
agreed. For more information, see 
 http://www.comunidadandina.org/normativa/dec/D659.htm  
10 The members of CARICOM are: Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, 
Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, Saint Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, 
Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago. 
11 The members of MERCOSUR are: Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay. On 4 July 2006, MERCOSUR 
members approved the Protocol of Adhesion of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to MERCOSUR. The 
entry into force of the Protocol must be ratified by the parliaments of the five countries involved. As of April 
2011, the approval of the Congress of Paraguay was still pending. 
12 In December 2008, MERCOSUR adopted a Plan of Action to Further the Program for the Liberalization of 
Trade in Services. This Plan of Action has a four-stage timeline, the target being to complete the liberalization 
program in 2015. By 2009: each member had to analyze the current situation to define the least sensitive 
sectors (whose liberalization would not pose serious problems), as well as those of intermediate and high 
sensitivity, and those whose regulatory frameworks could be harmonized or complemented. By 2010: each 
member committed to consolidate the regulatory status quo of sectors where no commitments yet exist; to 
eliminate restrictions on market access and national treatment in the least sensitive sectors; and to take steps 
to harmonize or complement regulatory frameworks in sectors where this is deemed necessary. By 2012: each ADBI Working Paper 307                                                Stephenson and Robert 
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worth noting though that Uruguay, a MERCOSUR member, has also elected the NAFTA-
type approach in its free trade agreement with Mexico, which entered into force on 15 July 
2004, although the negative list has yet to be completed.
13
As mentioned above, members of all but one of the sub-regional agreements negotiated by 
countries in the Americas have adopted the NAFTA modality of the negative list approach for 
liberalizing services trade as outlined above (see Box 1).
  
14
Although there is no doubt that the  Americas is  in fact the region that has the most 
wholeheartedly moved beyond the multilateral system toward deeper and more 
comprehensive services disciplines, two countries have in recent years gone back on the 
NAFTA model. In 2006, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela withdrew from the Group of 
Three (G3) Free Trade Agreement
 This stands in contrast to 
countries in other regions of the world, where the “positive list”  approach continues to 
dominate. However, many of the RTAs that countries of the Americas have exported to 
trading partners outside the region have also been based on a NAFTA-type, negative list 
approach, which means that the innovations discussed in this section for the treatment of 
services trade have found their way around the world.  
15 between Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela, which had 
entered into force on 1 January 1995. And Bolivia withdrew from the Bolivia-Mexico Free 
Trade Agreement, in force since 1 January 1995, and replaced it with an Economic 
Complementarity Agreement (No. 66) with Mexico, which came into force on 7 June 2010. 
The  Plurinational State of Bolivia  considered  “the chapters on investment, services, 
intellectual property and government procurement incompatible with the country’s new 
Constitution, which had entered into  force in February 2009.” (ECLAC 2010:100)
16
                                                                                                                                                  
member committed to eliminate restrictions on market access and national treatment in sectors of intermediate 
sensitivity. By 2015: each member committed to eliminate restrictions on market access and national treatment 
in the most sensitive sectors and to eliminate domestic regulatory measures that have been identified as 
bureaucratic obstacles to intra-zone trade. For more information, see  
   The 
scope of the new agreement is strictly limited to trade in goods and does not include any 
service-related provisions. 
http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/MRCSRS/Decisions/DEC4908_s.pdf  On 16 December 2010 the 
MERCOSUR Common Market Council reiterated to MERCOSUR members the need to implement the 
December 2008 decision. For more information, see 
http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/MRCSRS/Decisions/DEC5410_s.pdf.  
13 The agreement does not cover financial services, air transport services, or government procurement. For more 
information, see http://www.sice.oas.org/TPD/MEX_URY/Negotiations/Texto_s.pdf  
14 For more information on the experience of Latin American countries in implementing the trade agreements 
they have signed with the US, see Robert (2011). 
15 For more information, see http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/go3/G3INDICE.ASP. 
16 See ECLAC (2010) Latin America and the Caribbean in the World Economy 2009–2010 ADBI Working Paper 307                                                Stephenson and Robert 
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Box 1: 
Liberalization Modality in RTAs in the Americas 
Choice of Liberalization Modality 
 
Negative List Approach  Entry into Force 
NAFTA  1994 
Costa Rica-Mexico  1995 
Group of Three (Colombia-Mexico-Venezuela), now G-2  1995
17 
Canada-Chile  1997 
Mexico-Nicaragua  1998 
Chile-Mexico  1999 
Mexico-Northern Triangle  2001 






Chile-US  2004 
Mexico-Uruguay  2004 
CARICOM  2006
21 




Chile-Panama  2008 
Peru-US   2009 
Chile-Peru  2009 
Chile-Colombia  2009 








  Signed 
Colombia–US (signed)  2006 
Panama-US (signed)  2007 
Canada-Panama (signed)  2010 
Mexico-Peru (signed)  2011 
Panama-Peru (signed)  2011 
Costa Rica-Peru (signed)  2011 
Positive List Approach  Entry into Force 
MERCOSUR  2005 
Source: OAS Foreign Trade Information System (SICE). 
 
                                                 
17 The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela withdrew from the G-3 in 2006. 
18 The agreement entered into force in: Costa Rica on 7 March 2002; El Salvador on 4 October 2001; Guatemala 
on 3 October  2001; Honduras on 19 December 2001; and Nicaragua on 3 September 2002. 
19 The agreement entered into force in 2002 in Costa Rica and El Salvador; in 2008 in Honduras; and in 2010 in 
Guatemala. The bilateral protocol between Chile and Nicaragua was signed on 23 February 2011. 
20 The agreement entered into force in: Costa Rica on 23 November  2008;  El Salvador on 11 April  2003; 
Guatemala on 22 June 2009; Honduras on 9 January 2009; and Nicaragua on 21 November 2009. 
21 The CARICOM Single Market entered into force on 1 January 2006. 
22 For more information, see: http://www.comunidadandina.org/comercio/comercio_servicios.htm  
23 The agreement entered into force in: Costa Rica on 1 January 2009; Dominican Republic on 1 March 2007; El 
Salvador on 1 March 2006; Guatemala on 1 July 2006; and Honduras and Nicaragua on 1 April 2006. For 
more information on how Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic have been willing to overcome political 
economy obstacles to take on significant disciplines in the area of services trade in the CAFTA-DR, see Robert 
and Stephenson (2008). 
24 The agreement entered into force in: El Salvador on 1 February 2010; Guatemala on 13 November 2009; and 
Honduras on 27 March 2010. 
25 It is expected that the FTA will enter into force on 15 August 2011. ADBI Working Paper 307                                                Stephenson and Robert 
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  Asia 
Several countries of the Americas have in turn taken the NAFTA-type approach beyond the 
borders of the region to “export” this model around the world. They have negotiated similar 
agreements with trading partners in Asia, Northern Africa, and the Middle East. To date, 
more than 20  NAFTA-type  agreements have been negotiated over the past 15 years 
between countries of the Americas and those outside the region, most of these with East 
Asia.  
East Asia as a whole does not have an “institutional” regionalism, and East Asia’s economic 
integration  relies largely on  regional production and trade networks—a “market-driven” 
integration.
26
However, since 2000, East Asian countries have been actively engaging in RTAs, with a 
resulting network at present of multiple bilateral, intra-regional,  and  cross-regional 
agreements among them as shown in Table 1, the latest key illustration being the Economic 
Cooperation Framework Agreement signed by the PRC and Taipei,China in June 2010. 
 Before 2000, there were roughly 75 effective RTAs in the world, but only five 
RTAs in East Asia, all of them being legally covered by the Enabling Clause under the WTO 
with a negligible scope of trade liberalization (Protocol on Trade Negotiations Asia-Pacific 
Trade Agreement, Global System of Trade Preferences among Developing Countries, Laos-
Thailand Preferential Trade Agreement, and ASEAN Preferential Trade Agreement [PTA]). 














PRC  9  1  7  0 
Hong Kong, China  1  0  1  0 
India  12  1  2  0 
Indonesia  7  0  4  0 
Japan  11  0  10  0 
Republic of Korea  8  1  5  0 
Malaysia  8  0  5  0 
Philippines  8  0  4  0 
Singapore  18  0  15  0 
Taipei,China  3  0  3  0 
Thailand  10  0  6  0 
Viet Nam  7  0  4  0 
Note: PTAs are preferential trade agreements and EIAs are economic integration agreements. 
Source: WTO PTA Database (http://RTAis.wto.org/). 
Now, the East Asian region is at the forefront of regionalism.
27
                                                 
26 Bark and Kang (2011). 
 Out of 286 RTAs notified to 
the WTO as of September 2010, East Asian countries were participants in 171 PTAs (60% 
of the total). The RTA race in the region is not over yet because other East Asian countries 
are currently aggressively engaging in regional trade talks. 
27 See Kawai and Wingnaraja (2010). ADBI Working Paper 307                                                Stephenson and Robert 
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  Europe 
In Europe, the EU has been the key driver of the proliferation of RTAs. The EU itself, initially 
established in 1957 as the European Economic Community, is the world’s largest 
preferential agreement. Twenty-nine RTAs had been notified to the WTO by the European 
Union, as of the end of May 2011, of which only eight cover services (see Table 2). After 
imposing a moratorium on negotiating new RTAs from 1999 to 2006 to focus on the WTO 
Doha Round, the EU in 2007 adopted a new trade policy and began negotiating a new 
generation of more ambitious or comprehensive RTAs. As recently noted by Ahearn (2011), 
continuing lack of progress in the Doha negotiations was an important consideration in the 
EU’s decision to lift the moratorium, as were other factors,  including  pressures from 
European businesses to include what the US was offering in its agreements and to insert 
competition and investment policy, two issues that  are not part of the Doha Round 
negotiations.
28
 Table 2: EU Preferential Trade Arrangements Notified to the WTO (Services) 
  
Country  Coverage  Type  Notification  Status 
EC-Albania  Goods and 
Services  FTA & EIA 
GATT Art. XXIV 






Services  FTA & EIA 
GATT Art. XXIV 
& GATS Article 
V 
In force 
EC-Chile  Goods and 
Services  FTA & EIA 
GATT Art. XXIV 
& GATS Article 
V 
In force 
EC-Croatia  Goods and 
Services  FTA & EIA 
GATT Art. XXIV 







Services  FTA & EIA 
GATT Art. XXIV 
& GATS Article 
V 
In force 
EC-Mexico  Goods and 
Services  FTA & EIA 
GATT Art. XXIV 
& GATS Article 
V 
In force 
EC-Montenegro  Goods and 
Services  FTA & EIA 
GATT Art. XXIV 




Area  Services  EIA 
GATT Art. XXIV 
& GATS Article 
V 
In force 
Note: PTAs are preferential trade agreements and EIAs are economic integration agreements. 
Source: WTO PTA Database (http://RTAis.wto.org/). 
2.2  Political economy considerations in pursuing RTAs in services 
Why are RTAs proliferating? A first answer flows from the few economic forces driving the 
sometimes conflicting demands for RTAs: the desire to benefit from trade preferences, but 
also to avoid to be excluded from preferences granted to other countries, the willingness to 
improve domestic policy coherence and also to have deeper coordination with partners, the 
tendency to favor or not “the big over the small”.  
Not all regional negotiations are identical and not all regional partners have the same ability 
to extract a high level of engagement. Services trade negotiations are fashioned by the 
political and economic environment in which they take place, and they encompass an 
international component and a domestic element. Governments can use trade negotiations 
                                                 
28 See Ahearn (2011). ADBI Working Paper 307                                                Stephenson and Robert 
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to take advantage of the outside pressure offered by these processes to mobilize public 
support and domestic groups for their objectives. They may also build coalitions and 
alliances with other parties or transnational actors to enhance their chance of achieving their 
preferred outcome. This process seems to be easier to achieve in a regional context than in 
the multilateral context of the WTO negotiations for a variety of reasons, the most obvious 
one being the lack of focused external pressure and the lack of clearly identified benefits in 
the multilateral context, traceable to desired objectives. 
However, when negotiators encounter adversity at home and strongly entrenched vested 
interests against  the opening of certain sectors, building such coalitions may prove 
extremely problematic, to the point that achieving the services commitment may  be 
impossible without a huge component of external pressure that can be evoked either in the 
form of the enticement of a very large market or the clout of a very powerful trading partner.  
The new regionalism of the recent RTAs represents a break with history, in that these new 
agreements respond to a new economic logic, which is investment-driven. This is particularly 
true for smaller developing  economies  like the Central American countries and the 
Dominican Republic, for whom the signaling effects of an RTA with a developed country, like 
the US, help them attract investment, serve as an export platform of goods and services to 
larger markets, and, in so doing, contribute to  foster growth and development. Such 
agreements also lock in key domestic reforms. This explains why smaller developing 
countries have signed on  to  free trade agreements over the past decade that  contain 
disciplines in “new” areas such as trade in services, investment, technical barriers to trade, 
competition policy, and intellectual property. 
An additional and powerful foreign policy motive for RTA proliferation emerges very clearly in 
the US- and EU-related RTAs, though in quite different terms. It is also visible in the case of 
the small economies which have consistently looked at RTAs as “hubs” which reinforce their 
political ties as well as fit their economic needs.  
  The US 
In the US case, the foreign policy component is critical for the choice of the RTA partner, but 
economic motives dominate the shaping of the content of the RTAs—hence the strong 
similarity of the structure of all the US-related RTAs. While foreign policy and military alliance 
relations loom large in the US choice of RTA partners, the detailed content of US pacts has 
been far more influenced by economic than political considerations. Starting with the Israel 
pact, the US has sought to include “frontier” subjects, which are well beyond the scope of 
contemporary GATT or WTO agreements. Thus the Free Trade Agreement with Israel 
covered, for the first time, trade in services; CUSFTA covered services and investment and 
incorporated  a dispute settlement mechanism; NAFTA covered services, investment, 
intellectual property and government procurement, along with side agreements on labor and 
environment; and similar subjects were addressed in most of the subsequent agreements. 
Comprehensive economic coverage in trade pacts was not only the policy of successive 
presidents, starting with Ronald Reagan; it also responded to the insistence of key 
Congressional committees that focused more on the economic opportunities and challenges 
created by the pacts than their foreign policy consequences. 
  Europe 
By contrast, in the EU case, the foreign policy component is not decisive in the choice of the 
RTA partner—the EU is ready to sign a RTA with almost every country in the world, except 
the PRC and the US. Rather, this component emerges in the much wider scope of the 
content of the EU-related RTAs, with a long list of provisions of little economic value and no 
enforceable commitment, but bringing some foreign policy aspects. The European RTAs 
have always been permeated by foreign policy considerations. First, the EU itself was a way 
to stop wars among European nations. Second, the Preamble of the Treaty of Rome which 
founded the EU aims to  “lay  down  the foundations of an ever closer union among the ADBI Working Paper 307                                                Stephenson and Robert 
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peoples of Europe” (EEC 1957)
29
Since then, the EU has shown a distinctive “addiction to discrimination” (Wolf 1994: 22) 
fuelled by two aspects of foreign policy.
—quite a brave statement a few months after Soviet tanks 
had crushed the Hungarian Revolution. Then, the Treaty of Rome opened the door to RTAs 
between the EU and the rest of the world when dealing with former European colonies (now 
the African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries, or ACPs). 
30
The most recent illustration of this addiction is the “Global Europe Trade Strategy” initiative 
launched by Lord Mandelson in 2006 and carried on in 2010 by K. de Gucht. Like the 
previous ones, this initiative obeys to two key considerations of European foreign policy, 
quite different from those described in the US case.  First is the implicit rivalry with the US. 
Since the late 1990s and early 2000s, this motive has pushed the EU to make inroads in the 
US sphere of influence by signing RTAs with countries having or close to having a RTA with 
the US—Chile, Caribbean, Central American and Andean countries, Jordan, Mexico. Since 
2006, the Global Europe initiative has aimed to preempt US RTAs, the best illustration being 
the Republic of Korea-EU FTA, signed on 6 October 2010 in Brussels. The negotiation of a 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA)  with Canada, the US largest 
trading partner, launched in 2009 is another manifestation of the rivalry with the US. This 
motive  continues to dominate the EU approach with respect to large potential trading 
partners, such as MERCOSUR, India, or the ASEAN countries. 
 First is the competition between the European 
Commission and the member states for being in charge of foreign affairs, with trade being 
for the Commission a way to progressively step in the broader foreign affairs agenda. 
Second, almost every member state wants to include its zone of (past) influence in an EU 
RTA: Mexico and MERCOSUR (and Latin America, more generally) for Spain and Portugal; 
Eastern European neighbors for Germany, Poland, and Romania; Mediterranean countries 
for France and Italy; etc. 
The second foreign policy motive is the EU conviction that it has the best governance in the 
world and that it should use its “soft power” to export this governance to different regions of 
the world. This aspect is dominant in the RTAs between the EU and small economies, such 
as the ACPs, the Mediterranean countries, the Gulf countries, and the EU neighbors in the 
Balkans and in Eastern Europe (Ukraine, Caucasus). This driving force has faced some 
fierce resistance among the EU trading partners, as best illustrated by the de facto impasse 
in many of the RTAs negotiated with the ACPs. 
Combined, these two motives give a very distinctive shape to the EU-related RTAs. First, the 
EU has a long list of RTA provisions that are totally absent in the US-related RTAs. Out of a 
total of 54 standard RTAs provisions, 31 provisions are found only in EU-related RTAs.
31
However, as these intents are similar to those supporting EU laws and regulations, they are 
used by the EU as a “creeping export process” of its own regulatory framework to its trading 
partners. This is the very frequent recourse towards the notion of “convergence” among the 
EU and partners regulations—of course, a convergence towards EU regulations. Such an 
approach creates severe frustrations among the EU RTA partners who discover too late that 
they may have signed texts with more commitments than initially thought and who are not 
ready to abide by them. 
  
They range from competition policy, taxation, or consumer protection to health, information 
society, public administration, social matters, illegal immigration, asylum, terrorism, and 
human rights. Second, the foreign policy motive gives to the EU-RTA provisions a diplomatic 
tone expressing broad, often vague, intents to be fulfilled in the future, in sharp contrast with 
the legally enforceable terms of the US-related RTAs. 
                                                 
29 EEC (1957). See the Preamble section. 
30 Wolf (1994: 22). 
31 Horn, Mavroidis, and Sapir (2009). ADBI Working Paper 307                                                Stephenson and Robert 
  12 
  Asia 
Lastly, the Asian economies appear in an intermediate position with economic and foreign 
policy considerations driving the choice of the partners and the scope of the RTA content. 
Their shift from multilateralism to regionalism is based on several factors. On the one hand, 
the strong “market-driven”  feature in East Asia lends  a key role to economic factors. 
Moreover, the fact that East Asian countries have become major players of international 
trade makes quite reasonable for most countries in the world to participate in RTA talks with 
East Asian countries. On the other hand, foreign policy considerations are surfacing.  East 
Asian RTAs are seen as a practical and cooperative response to the spread of regionalism 
throughout the world, with the hope to secure foreign markets, in particular their neighboring 
countries, threatened by US-  and EU-related RTAs. Second, there has been a more 
competitive aspect among East Asian RTAs, in particular the race to become the regional 
“hub” in East Asia, an important motive behind the approach of the ASEAN countries or the 
Republic of Korea. 
Third, the successive disasters and crises in the East Asian region, from the financial crisis 
in 1997–98 to the 2003 health crisis related to the Severely Acute Respiratory Syndrome 
(SARS) to bird flu in 2003 to the 2004 Indonesian tsunami to the 2008–2009 financial crisis 
to the 2011 Japanese nuclear disaster, have exposed the lack of intra-Asian cooperation 
mechanisms.  Efforts to enhance intra-regional cooperation  and  economic integration are 
seen as a good, pragmatic, demand-driven option to address such issues. 
That said, East Asian countries must overcome several challenges in the near future. The 
utilization of RTAs by exporters should be improved: RTA-related preferences are 
underutilized in East Asia, a factor which compounds the relatively shallow East Asian 
integration, with many RTAs showing a relatively low coverage of products and services and 
wide exceptions of sensitive products and sectors. Other challenges include the promotion of 
a more  comprehensive coverage of trade in both goods and services, and dealing  with 
multiple rules of origin to form a region-wide RTA in East Asia. 
In this respect, the new developments in Northeast Asian economic integration are 
particularly interesting.  Recently,  the Republic of Korea  and  the PRC have started RTA 
discussions at the government level, and the Republic of Korea  and Japan are now 
discussing the resumption of their bilateral RTA talks that halted in late 2004. Moreover, at a 
PRC-Japan-Republic of Korea summit meeting held in October 2009, the heads of state 
agreed to conduct a study regarding the possible formation of a PRC-Japan-Republic of 
Korea RTA and to discuss the result of the study at their summit meeting in 2012. The 
evaluation of a Northeast Asia RTA is likely to be more positive and deemed more efficient 
than separate bilateral RTAs among the three countries. Once this study is completed, the 
Republic of Korea, Japan, and the PRC should examine whether they will continue to pursue 
bilateral RTAs or integrate them into a trilateral RTA. 
2.3  RTA convergence: a bottom-up approach 
Given the myriad number and complexity of RTAs now existing, a new phenomenon has 
begun recently with a bottom-up movement toward convergence by like-minded members of 
some of the RTAs. This convergence is an interesting development in  the panorama of 
regionalism and can be seen as an effort to rationalize the complications created by 
numerous sets of rules and market access requirements contained in overlapping regional 
agreements.  
Examples of movement toward RTA convergence so far are very recent and still limited. 
However, they are gaining traction and significance as governments may finally be reacting 
to the complexities of an ever-growing network of RTAs and attempt to bring greater 
rationalization to the situation through a voluntary merging of agreements.  ADBI Working Paper 307                                                Stephenson and Robert 
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The initiatives that we observe in the direction of replacing multiple RTAs by large regional 
agreements are taking place in several regions of the world and among a variety of 
countries, large and small, developed and developing alike. Interestingly, most of these 
initiatives emphasize trade and economic integration within a given region, and not between 
regions. In Europe, the EU has expanded its membership and the scope of its economic 
integration arrangement to countries in the Mediterranean, Eastern Europe, and the Balkans. 
In Asia a ten-year strategic plan was agreed in 2007 to realize the long-posited East Asian 
Free Trade Agreement through expanding ASEAN to include the major economies of the 
PRC, Japan and the Republic of Korea. In the Americas negotiations began in 2008 among 
11 economies bordering on the Pacific to create an Arco del Pacifico agreement through 
consolidating 11 existing NAFTA-type RTAs.  
RTAs have proliferated at an astonishing rate in both the Americas and Asia, as well as in 
Africa. The lack of a coherent, region-wide framework has led to a variety of agreements 
among countries, covering different products, trade disciplines, phase-outs, rules of origin, 
and other.  
While the Americas were at the forefront of regional activity for the decade of the 1990s, 
Asia has since caught up and has now surpassed the Americas as the region with the 
highest number of intra-regional agreements per country.
32 The countries of the Americas 
(including the US and Canada) had concluded or deepened 64 bilateral trade agreements 
and customs unions between 2000 and 2010, as compared with a total of 61 concluded 
RTAs for the 16 Asian economies during this same period.
33
In Europe, the EU has continued to expand from its six original members in 1952 to 27 
members, through five successive enlargements over the period 1973 to 2007. This 
expansion absorbed seven former members of the European Free Trade Association 
(EFTA) and ten members of the former Eastern Europe trading bloc, as well as other smaller 
European nations.
 This proliferation is continuing 
apace, as 71 new agreements are currently under negotiation in the Americas and around 
80 RTAs are either under negotiation or proposed in Asia. In Africa the total number of RTAs 
concluded between 2000 and 2010 is less than that in either Asia or the Americas, but these 
have been increasing at a rapid pace. Countries in Africa have also been engaged in 
regionalism but at a slower pace and with a resounding preference for customs unions rather 
than free trade agreements.  
34 The current 27 members of the EU represent no less than 85% of the 
continent’s gross domestic product (GDP) and 68% of the continent’s intra-regional trade.
35
                                                 
32The World Bank’s FTA Database provides information on the number of regional agreements concluded around 
the world. It can be found at: 
 
http://wits.worldbank.org/wits/gptad.htm. The WTO database on regional trade 
agreements provides information on a subset of these, namely the PTAs that have been notified by their 
members to the WTO. It can be found at: http://rtais.wto.org/?lang=1. Both databases can be searched by 
country, region, legal provisions, date of notification or entry into force. The OAS Foreign Trade System 
provides extensive information on PTAs that have been concluded or are under negotiation by countries in the 
Americas. It can be found at: www.sice.oas.org. 
33 See Kawai and Wignaraja (2010). This study points out that on the whole, Asia seems to be opting for bilateral 
agreements rather than plurilateral ones. Information on trade agreements in the Americas is taken from the 
Organization of American States  (OAS) Trade Agreements Database which can be found at 
www.sice.oas.org.  
34 EU integration area has effectively, if not formally, been extended to the remaining states of EFTA as well 
through the European Economic Area (EEA) Agreement, which entered into force in January 1994 for the EU 
States and is currently in effect with Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway. The other EFTA member—
Switzerland—has concluded two sets of bilateral agreements with the EU in 1999 and 2004. Under the EEA 
Agreement and the bilateral agreement, the Internal Market of the EU is extended to these four countries and 
EFTA States can conduct their business under the same legal framework and are subject to the same rights 
and obligations as operators in the EU States. See A Short Introduction to 50 Years of EFTA: A Fact Sheet of 
the European Free Trade Association, April 2010, at http://www.efta.int/publications/fact-sheets/general/short-
history.aspx. 
35  The figures on European intra-regional trade have been taken from 
www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2008_e/section1_e/its08_highlights1_e.pdf ADBI Working Paper 307                                                Stephenson and Robert 
  14 
  The Americas 
Several experiments are underway in the Americas—of which there is little awareness as of 
yet—to consolidate similar regional trade agreements. Given the large number and 
overlapping levels of regulatory complexity created by RTAs with various configurations of 
membership, a bottom-up movement toward convergence has begun recently in the 
Western Hemisphere. The move toward convergence represents an attempt to rationalize 
the complications created by numerous sets of disciplines and market access requirements 
among several like-minded parties to RTAs based on a similar NAFTA-type template. 
The effort at convergence in the Americas has been spearheaded under the guise of the 
Arco del Pacífico initiative and involves 11 Latin American countries that border the Pacific 
and who are parties to numerous  NAFTA-type RTAs. Participating countries are Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, 
Panama, and Peru. The US and Canada, although also parties to NAFTA and NAFTA-type 
RTAs, are not participating in this convergence effort.
36
The objectives of the Arco del Pacifico  initiative are three: to deepen existing trade 
agreements and eventually move toward common rules; to broaden economic cooperation 
and trade facilitation among participating countries; and to engage more deeply in 
coordinated economic relations with the Asia-Pacific region.
  
37 To date, six ministerial 
meetings have been held and four Working Groups have been set up to focus the 
discussions, including a key one on “Trade Convergence and Economic Integration.”
38 This 
Working Group has been given the task of identifying ways of moving toward common rules 
on accumulation of origin, a complex issue. The group has also been asked to analyze 
existing trade and integration agreements in the areas of technical barriers to trade, sanitary 
and phytosanitary measures, customs procedures, trade facilitation, countervailing 
measures, services, investment, government procurement  competition policy and dispute 
settlement, to see how existing disciplines may be made to converge.
39
While only at the beginning, this convergence effort of the Arco del Pacifico represents a 
major initiative in the Americas to consolidate existing RTAs into a broader agreement.
  
40
                                                                                                                                                  
Croatia is currently in the final stages of negotiating its accession to the EU, with the objective of finalizing this in 
mid-2011, to subsequently become the 28
th member state of the EU. 
 The 
effort may gain in significance as governments finally react to the complexities of an ever-
36 The US is a party to six FTAs with countries in the Americas (NAFTA with Canada and Mexico, and FTAs with 
Chile, Peru, and the five Central American countries plus the Dominican Republic) and two more signed but 
not yet in force (with Colombia and Panama). There has, however, been an explosion of trade agreements in 
the region to which the US is not a party, including the discussions of the Arco del Pacífico, South American 
unification efforts and multiple bilateral agreements. The only ongoing negotiation in which the US is currently 
participating is that of the TPP or the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement. Though a relatively latecomer to 
the negotiations of regional agreements, despite the NAFTA, Canada has been actively pursuing FTAs over 
the recent period and has negotiated six such agreements with countries in the Americas (namely with Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Panama, and Peru, besides the NAFTA). Canada is involved in ongoing negotiations 
with CARICOM, Central America (CA-4), and the Dominican Republic. 
37 See chapter IV on “Integration and Trade Initiatives” in ECLAC (2009).  
38 The other three Working Groups set up under the Arco del Pacífico  initiative are: Trade Facilitation and 
Infrastructure; Investment Promotion and Protection; and Competitiveness. 
39 The website of the Arco del Pacifico initiative can be found at: http://www.arcodelpacifico.org. 
40 A parallel initiative launched by President George W. Bush, also in 2008, is the “Pathways to Prosperity in the 
Americas,” ongoing among 15 countries representing 86% of hemispheric trade. Almost all these countries 
(excluding Belize, but including Uruguay which has a FTA with Mexico) is party to one of more similar NAFTA-
type FTAs. The overarching goal of Pathways is to expand economic opportunities for all as markets become 
increasingly integrated and promote inclusive growth and prosperity, in part through the sharing of experiences 
and best practices aimed at empowering small business, facilitating trade, building a modern workforce, and 
developing responsible and sustainable business practices by improving environmental practices, protections, 
and cooperation. Ministerial meetings among participating countries are held once a year. There are no plans 
to open talks on convergence at present and it is unlikely that this issue could come up in the near future. The 
website for the “Pathways to Prosperity in the Americas” is: http://www.pathways-caminos.org. ADBI Working Paper 307                                                Stephenson and Robert 
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growing network of regional agreements and attempt to bring greater rationalization to this 
situation.
 41
Another convergence effort is taking place between six members of the Arco del Pacifico, 
that is, between Mexico and Central America. In June 2008, on the occasion of the 10th 
Tuxtla Mechanism Summit, the countries of the region agreed to initiate negotiations aimed 
at achieving convergence of their free trade agreements into a single instrument. On 26 
March 2009, the vice ministers of foreign  trade of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Nicaragua, and Mexico agreed on an action plan for the convergence of their free 
trade agreements. From May 2010 to May 2011, five negotiating rounds were held.
  
42
Finally, it is worth noting that four ARCO members, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru 
signed the Declaration of Lima on 28 April 2011, launching the “Pacific Alliance,” which 
creates a framework for “deep integration” that will eventually allow for the freer movement 
of goods, services, people, and capital among these four ARCO members.
 
43
  Europe 
 
In Europe, the expansion of the EU has created convergence. The EU is now composed of 
27  sovereign  member states representing nearly 90% of the continent’s GDP and 
approximately 70% of the continent’s intra-regional trade.
44
There are five official candidate countries—Croatia, Iceland, Macedonia, Montenegro, and 
Turkey. Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia are officially recognized as potential 
candidates. Kosovo is also listed as a potential candidate but the European Commission 
does not list it as an independent country because not all member states recognize it as an 
independent country separate from Serbia. 
 The Union's membership has 
grown from the original six founding states of the European Economic Community—Belgium, 
France, (then West-) Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands—to the present day 
27 by successive enlargements as countries acceded to the treaties and by doing so, pooled 
their sovereignty in exchange for representation in the institutions. To join the EU a country 
must meet the Copenhagen criteria, defined at the 1993 Copenhagen European Council. 
These require a stable democracy that respects human rights  and the rule of law; a 
functioning market economy capable of competition within the EU; and the acceptance of the 
obligations of membership, including EU law. Evaluation of a country's fulfillment of the 
criteria is the responsibility of the European Council. No member state has ever left the 
Union, although Greenland (an autonomous province of Denmark) withdrew in 1985. The 
Lisbon Treaty now provides a clause dealing with how a member leaves the EU. 
Four Western European countries that are not EU members have partly committed to the 
EU's legislations: Iceland (a candidate country for EU membership), Liechtenstein, and 
                                                 
41 If the Arco del Pacifico  attempt at convergence should prosper, the question must be asked as to what 
becomes of the numerous bilateral and plurilateral FTAs currently in force among the 11 participants? Would 
the broader regional agreement replace these or would they all continue to co-exist, either during a transition 
phase or indefinitely?
 The solution envisaged by the negotiators of the now abandoned FTAA (Free Trade 
Area of the Americas) agreement designed to include all of the democratically elected governments of the 
Americas was to include a provision allowing pre-existing sub-regional integration agreements to continue 
operational only in the case where their provisions went beyond or were deeper than the broader regional 
FTAA agreement. 
42 The first round of negotiations for the convergence of the existing free trade agreements between Central 
American countries and Mexico took place in Mexico City in May 2010. The second round was held in San 
Salvador in August 2010. The third round of negotiations took place in Mexico City on September 27–30, 2010, 
the fourth round in Guatemala on 31 January–4 February 2011, and the fifth round was held in Mexico City in 
May 2011. 
43  See nota de prensa 5690 of 28 April 2011 on  the website of the Government of Peru: 
http://www.presidencia.gob.pe/index.asp  
44 Austria,  Belgium,  Bulgaria,  Cyprus, the Czech Republic,  Denmark,  Estonia,  Finland,  France,  Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Republic of 
Ireland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. ADBI Working Paper 307                                                Stephenson and Robert 
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Norway, which are a part of the single market through the European Economic Area, and 
Switzerland, which has similar ties through bilateral treaties. The relationships of the 
European microstates Andorra, Monaco, San Marino, and the Vatican include the use of the 
euro and other areas of cooperation. 
  Asia 
The ten members of ASEAN have long considered their grouping as a nucleus from which 
an expanding area of East Asian integration would grow, based on the template of the 
ASEAN Free Trade Area agreement (AFTA) and the ASEAN Framework Agreement on 
Services (AFAS), and they have been moving consistently in such a way as to make this 
happen. The first objective is that of an East Asian Free Trade Agreement involving the 
ASEAN+3 of the PRC, Japan, and the Republic of Korea. However, rather than embarking 
on a region-wide negotiation, ASEAN members have preferred to negotiate a series of 
individual bilateral trade agreements with these three major East Asian trading partners, all 
of which have now been completed as detailed below. The next step will be the attempt to 
merge these existing agreements into a broader one. At end 2007 the heads of 
state/government of the ASEAN+3 (the PRC, Japan, the Republic  of Korea) countries 
adopted a Cooperation Work Plan, set to run for ten years (2007–2017) which is to result in 
the conclusion of all of the ASEAN+1 FTAs, together with their implementation, and the 
intensification of discussions to establish a region-wide FTA.
45
In addition to the convergence efforts of the ASEAN+3 which are now getting underway 
more earnestly, 16 nations in East Asia are simultaneously entertaining the prospect of an 
even broader integration effort that is being spearheaded by Japan in the form of the 
“Comprehensive Economic Partnership for East Asia  (CEPEA).”  This proposal would 
encompass the 16 members of the East Asia Summit, which includes the ASEAN Plus 
Three members together with India, Australia, and New Zealand. These two processes are 
currently  not  viewed as alternatives  in the region,  and both are being pursued 
simultaneously.  
 Economic and financial 
cooperation is a key section of the Work Plan in this regard. Labor mobility is to be a part of 
this discussion, as well as measures to promote trade facilitation. The objective of expanding 
the ASEAN Investment Area to a broader East Asia Investment area is also mentioned. 
The  six  members  other than ASEAN that are involved in the CEPEA discussions have 
negotiated a series of separate arrangements with various other members of the grouping. 
However, ASEAN has recently completed free trade agreements with all of the other six 
members of the East Asia Summit. Thus the ASEAN model or template has effectively been 
accepted by end 2010, with slight variations, by all of the other East Asian trading partners. It 
seems very likely that the ASEAN template will be taken as the basis for convergence. If so, 
the CEPEA negotiations would involve the merging of the five existing arrangements below 
into a broader, region-wide trade agreement at some point in the future: 
                                                 
45 The Second Joint Statement on East Asia Cooperation: Building on the Basis of ASEAN Plus Three 
Cooperation, adopted by the Leaders of the ASEAN Plus Three countries in Singapore on 20 November 2007 
can be found at the ASEAN Secretariat website : http://www.aseansec.org/21099.htm The ASEAN Plus Three 
Cooperation Work Plan 2007–2017 to realize these objectives can be found at: 
http://www.aseansec.org/21104.pdf. ADBI Working Paper 307                                                Stephenson and Robert 
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  ASEAN Economic Partnership Agreement with Japan (December 2008);  
  ASEAN- Republic of Korea Free Trade Agreement (trade in goods provisions 
came into effect in June 2007, an agreement for trade in services was signed 
in 2007, and the trade in investments provisions were signed in 2009);  
  ASEAN-PRC Free Trade Area (January 2010)  
  Free Trade Agreement with Australia and New Zealand (jointly), the 
AANZFTA (January 2010); 
  ASEAN-India Trade in Goods (TIG) Agreement (January 2010); the Trade in 
Services and Investment Agreements are still under negotiation.  
Asian Leaders at the Fourth East Asia Summit of October 2009 welcomed both integration 
efforts (the East Asian Free Trade Agreement and the CEPEA). However, and more 
pointedly, the Statement of Leaders from the more recent 16th ASEAN Summit in April 2010 
emphasized the key core role of the ASEAN template in the architecture of the future 
agreement.
46
  Pros and Cons of Regional RTA Convergence 
  
The movement which seems to be gaining traction, though in its initial stages, of merging or 
“converging” existing RTAs around a commonly accepted template is taking hold in several 
regions of the world. The replacement of multiple bilateral RTAs by larger regional ones has 
both pros and cons and raises interesting questions of implementation. 
The positive aspects of this phenomenon are compelling due to the economic efficiency 
gains they would engender. Large regional RTAs provide potential answers to the “spaghetti 
bowl” problem of overlapping, multiple preferential agreements. They absorb the confusing 
array of “bilaterals/plurilaterals” into large, more economically beneficial and more integrative 
trade arrangements. As a result, the potential for trade diversion is reduced as the resulting 
larger RTA covers a greater share of its members’ trade. Additionally, simplification in the 
variety of rules and conditions for market access reduces the transactions costs for 
exporters. And the oversight requirements for government officials stemming from multiple 
trade agreements are also consolidated, thus reducing administrative costs as well.
47 
Convergence of various RTAs into broad regional groupings involving important trading 
partners brings the world economy closer to a more efficient global outcome. And economic 
modeling suggests that the larger the grouping, the larger the gain.
48
The negative aspects of convergence are linked to political economy factors as well as to 
potential implications for the governance of the multilateral trading system. Large RTAs can 
be difficult to negotiate, even between trading partners who have bilateral agreements based 
on a similar template. They require accommodation among major powers.
 
49
                                                 
46 The Summit Statement noted “...the initiatives being undertaken to take forward broader regional integration by 
considering the recommendations of both East Asia Free Trade Agreement (EAFTA) and the Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership for East Asia (CEPEA) studies together. We look forward to receiving the progress report 
at the 17th ASEAN Summit in October 2010 and to discussing with our Dialogue Partners the future direction of 
regional architecture with ASEAN at its core.”  (para 30, emphasis added). Working groups involving the 16 
nations in the CEPEA effort have since been formed in August 2010 to study Economic Cooperation, Rules of 
Origin, Customs Procedures and Tariff Nomenclature. 
 A large number 
47 Negotiating the rules of origin in a convergence effort is particularly challenging; for this reason the participants 
in the Arco del Pacifico initiative have chosen to highlight this area in the initial stage. However, if members 
manage to consolidate the rules of origin for various smaller agreements to allow for accumulation, then the 
benefits for exporters would be tremendous. 
48 See the feasibility study prepared by Robert Scollay on the “Possible Pathways towards a Free Trade Area of 
the Asia Pacific (FTAAP)” carried out at the request of the APEC Senior Officials in 2009 which can be found 
on the APEC website. www.apec.org.  
49 This is the case of the “ASEAN+3” and the CEPEA which will require agreement among the PRC, Japan, and 
the Republic of Korea, and the TPP whose negotiations involve the US and possibly soon Japan.  ADBI Working Paper 307                                                Stephenson and Robert 
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of members and numerous pre-existing RTAs may reduce the template to a less ambitious 
rather than a more ambitious level when the agreements converge, thus depriving the future 
broad agreement of its deeper integration potential. And division of the world economy into 
large, competing trading blocs may also serve to undermine the governance structure of the 
WTO, which is predicated on an open, non-discriminatory system of rules. The most favored 
nation (MFN) principle would be in effect permanently set aside were such large trading 
arrangements to be created, with attention of members directed to promotion of regional 
trade rather than to multilateral trade liberalization. Smaller developing countries and non-
members of the large regional groupings would be those to suffer most from the 
abandonment of an MFN-based multilateral trading system. The question of implications for 
governance may need to be posed in terms of which set of circumstances is most harmful 
for the WTO: the continued proliferation of small and overlapping RTAs or the move to 
consolidate these into larger trading blocs? 
With regard to implementation, the question must be asked of what becomes of all existing 
bilateral and plurilateral RTAs? Would the broader regional agreements replace these or 
would they all continue to co-exist, either during a transition phase or indefinitely?
  50
3.  GOVERNANCE 
 If 
immediate replacement is not realistic, then it would be necessary to design some sort of 
orderly path of transition toward the convergence of many agreements into one. One 
possibility in this regard is to include a provision allowing bilateral RTAs to continue to exist 
only in the case where their provisions go further than the broader agreement. 
Much of the expressed concern over RTAs has revolved around the question of whether 
they are supportive of, or detrimental to, the multilateral trading system. For services, the 
question would be how RTAs either support or debilitate the WTO GATS in its governance 
function as the keeper of rules and liberalization commitments on services trade for WTO 
members. 
A recent study carried out for the OECD Trade and Agriculture Directorate examines the 
political economy reasons for countries to enter into RTAs, dividing these between the 
strategic political and economic reasons and the domestic political and economic reasons. It 
finds that although countries of different sizes and levels of development have different 
motivations for entering into RTAs (including foreign policy reasons for large trading nations), 
on the whole RTAs are viewed to be not unfriendly to the multilateral trading system.
51 The 
study reaches this conclusion after examining various hypotheses on RTAs as precedent-
setters, the reasons behind the selection of partners and the decision to negotiate RTAs, the 
results of asymmetrical negotiations, the sequencing of reforms, RTAs as preferential 
instruments of foreign policy, and the domestic consequences of over-reaching services 
commitments. The study finds that the multilateral friendliness of a given RTA depends 
considerably on the strategic motivations of the countries that negotiate them, as political 
economy factors figure much more importantly in the decision and the content of RTAs than 
they do at the multilateral level. Despite the predominance of political considerations for the 
conclusion of RTAs, the study concludes that services provisions of RTAs are on the whole 
multilateral-friendly because the domestic politics of trade in services make it difficult to 
achieve real liberalization through binding agreements at any level.
52
                                                 
50 This was the solution envisaged by the negotiators of the FTAA (Free Trade Area of the Americas) draft 
agreement, which was to cover the 34 democratically elected governments of the Western hemisphere but 
which was never concluded after several years of preparation (1995–1998) and negotiation (1998 to 2004). 
 However, the more 
market-opening services commitments negotiated in RTAs are extended on an MFN basis, 
which is often the case, the more services will be supportive of the multilateral system.  
51 See VanGrasstek (2011). 
52 Ibid, p. 45. ADBI Working Paper 307                                                Stephenson and Robert 
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This section takes a somewhat different approach to examining the relationship between the 
multilateral trading system and regional trade agreements. In discussing this question and its 
implications for governance, we look at four different issues: architecture; compliance; ability 
to promote reforms; and actual impact of RTAs in fostering services trade. Our conclusions 
are somewhat more pessimistic than those of the OECD study in terms of systemic 
implications for the WTO, although our conclusions are similar to those of the OECD study in 
terms of the lack of discriminatory economic impact of RTAs in the services area. 
3.1  Architecture: are RTAs weakening the WTO GATS as an 
institution? 
Answer: Yes. The positive answer to this question arises from two reasons. The first is that 
WTO members have shown themselves less than enthusiastic about negotiating services in 
the Doha Round. Although begun more than a decade ago, the services negotiations soon 
lagged behind the other two main areas of the Round in terms of progress and attention has 
appeared to be focused elsewhere. No new offers have been put on the table in recent 
years. And in total, less than one-third of the WTO membership has submitted offers at all 
over the past decade (only 44 out of the 153 WTO members). What is currently on the table 
is considered  to be less than adequate in terms of the initial ambitions for a services 
outcome. Most developing countries have been wary of considering proposals of 
significance including across-the-board binding of cross-border services trade (modes 1 and 
2), the binding of a certain percentage of sectors for commitments on commercial presence 
(mode 3), or adjusting existing commitments to bind at the level contained in national laws or 
actual regulatory practice. Many developed countries have been unwilling to put forward 
more liberalizing proposals for temporary movement of natural persons (mode 4). 
The recent attempt to both invigorate and innovate in the GATS negotiations through the 
plurilateral negotiations in 2006–2007 unfortunately did not prosper, despite a considerable 
number of rather comprehensive plurilateral requests and several rounds of discussions. 
Very few developing countries participated in submitting plurilateral requests.
53
The second reason for a positive answer for the weakening of the multilateral system by 
RTAs is the development of an alternative structure to the GATS for governing services. As 
WTO members have not shown themselves willing to change anything in the GATS structure 
to improve its functioning, countries have continued to experiment in the regional arena and 
RTA innovations proliferate as alternatives to the multilateral system.  
 These 
discussions do not look likely to be revived. With the adoption of the  “competitive 
liberalization” approach by the US, the new EU negotiating blueprint in 2006 which 
legitimized the regional track and the Japanese negotiating strategy formally adopted in 
2002 and 2010 doing the same, together with the strong forays into regional negotiations 
over the past five years by the PRC and the Republic of Korea, negotiating dynamism by the 
major trading entities seems to have clearly changed orientation and to be focused on the 
pursuit of regionalism. 
Regionalism has provided a significant alternative structure for governing services trade in 
the form of the negative list approach which differs in many fundamental respects from the 
GATS. The negative list approach, begun with the ANZCERTA and the NAFTA agreements, 
has now been taken around the world, with many examples of RTAs in this architecture 
having been negotiated between trading partners in the Western Hemisphere, particularly 
the US, Mexico, Chile, Canada, and Peru, and countries in the region as well as trading 
partners of these countries in northern Africa, the Middle East, and East Asia.
54
                                                 
53  For more on the plurilateral negotiations and number of participating developing countries, see 
 To date, 
more than 20 negative list-type RTAs have been negotiated in the past 15 years between 
http://www.uscsi.org/wto/ 
54 See Stephenson and Robert (2011). ADBI Working Paper 307                                                Stephenson and Robert 
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countries of the Americas and those outside the region, and several negative list RTAs have 
been negotiated by countries within the East Asian region. At present, the largest experiment 
in regional integration involving services is being carried out under the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP) negotiations, begun in March 2010. The TPP is slated to become the 
nucleus of a possible future Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific (FTAAP), with a tentative 
completion date of November 2011 and once completed, could gradually evolve into an 
APEC-wide agreement, eventually embracing all 21 APEC members. Of the current nine 
participants in the TPP negotiations, seven have previously negotiated NAFTA-type negative 
list agreements on services and investment, and this is the model that is being followed for 
the TPP.
55
It is doubtful that this alternative negative-list or hybrid structure will prevail at the multilateral 
level given the resistance that manifested itself during the Doha Round negotiations to any 
changes in the GATS structure and rules. Thus these competing normative frameworks can 
be considered to provide alternative models for governing services trade and possibly to be 
at crossroads with each other.  
 
Having two parallel but alternative normative structures to govern service trade flows means 
that both negotiators and service providers need to learn two languages to navigate: the 
positive list language and the negative list language. This makes it confusing for service 
providers who are required to understand both a schedule of GATS commitments (which 
frequently do not translate into actual market access) and the non-conforming measures set 
out under a negative list schedule to determine under which conditions a given service (for 
example, construction/ engineering services) can be provided to a WTO member that is also 
an RTA partner. And government officials need to understand both types of architecture if 
their country has engaged in negative-list RTAs so that they will know which rules govern a 
given service transaction. This degree of complexity may be one of the reasons why a given 
RTA template tends to be reproduced on a consistent basis by major trading partners so as 
to minimize the degree of duplication.
56 Possibly for this reason as well we are at present 
witnessing a tendency toward the convergence of similar type RTAs in different regions of 
the world to minimize the transactions costs and the complexity of overlapping governance 
systems.
57
It is the architecture of the GATS itself that has allowed the development of an alternative 
approach to liberalizing services trade. The positive list architecture of the GATS is very 
different to that of the many RTAs structured according to the negative list approach and 
which various analysts have shown to have gone further than the GATS in disciplining 
services trade and in liberalization.
  
58
                                                 
55 The nine members participating in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations at present include: Brunei, 
Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore (the original four members of the Strategic Economic Partnership [SEP] 
agreement that came into effect in 2006), as well as Australia, Malaysia, Peru, the US, and Viet Nam. All of 
these economies with the exception of Malaysia and Viet Nam, have previously negotiated and currently have 
in place a NAFTA-type agreement involving services and investment. Japan has expressed an interest in 
joining the TPP negotiations but its parliament has not yet officially decided to do so. 
  
56 The US has developed a template that it reproduces very faithfully in RTA negotiations, to the point where 
trading partners of regional agreements are obliged to accept the template or not pursue the negotiations, such 
as happened in the case of Malaysia. The EU also has a template for services/ investment that it reproduces in 
its Economic Association Agreements and in its EPA with CARIFORUM. The US and Canada always negotiate 
under a negative list approach, while the EU, the PRC and ASEAN always negotiate under a positive list 
approach for services. Japan has entered into both types of agreements, depending upon its trading partners. 
While Chile prefers a negative list approach, it has shown itself flexible to accommodate the needs of its 
trading partners when necessary. 
57 See Stephenson (2011). 
58 See study by Fink and Molinuevo (2007) on East Asia and the study by Stephenson (2006) on “Comparing the 
Degree of Liberalization in Services under Multilateral and Regional Trade Agreements,” available on the 
PECC website. Both show the much more significant degree of coverage of services commitments and extent 
of liberalization in RTAs as compared with the GATS.  ADBI Working Paper 307                                                Stephenson and Robert 
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The one redeeming feature so far in the RTA panorama is the lack of agreements between 
the four major trading partners, namely the US, the EU, Japan, and the PRC. These 
countries, representing more than 50% of world trade in services, have so far not negotiated 
RTAs among themselves. This abstinence has meant that the governance function of the 
GATS has not been threatened as much as it would be if major trading entities were to 
abandon the multilateral trading system altogether in pursuit of bilateral or regional trading 
relations. If that does happen in the future, the governance of the WTO will be sorely tested 
and severely undermined in the services area, to a greater degree than it has been so far. 
3.2  Compliance: are RTAs weakening the compliance of WTO 
members with WTO rules? 
Answer: No and Yes. In the case of compliance with WTO rules, it is interesting to note that 
RTA members do not appear to be settling their services disputes in their regional 
agreements. They are thus not undermining the GATS system by forum shopping. In fact, of 
all the RTAs on services that are in effect, disputes have been brought up (to the authors’ 
knowledge) under only one (NAFTA). Either services disputes do not arise under RTAs or 
countries choose not to disagree with their RTA partners. Surveying all of the disputes that 
have been taken to the WTO, 22 cases cite the GATS in the request for consultations (as of 
June 2011).
59 Of these disputes, the US has been a complainant in nine, the European 
Communities in four, Canada and Japan each in one, with the other complaints having been 
brought by developing WTO members. Three disputes involve the sale and distribution of 
bananas, three disputes involve measures affecting financial services, three disputes involve 
distribution services and two disputes involve measures affecting the automotive industry. 
Interestingly, only one dispute brought to the WTO involved countries who were parties to a 
regional trading arrangement involving the issue of interconnection in telecommunications 
between the US and Mexico.
60 In fact, under the NAFTA two disputes have arisen on 
services between the US and Mexico. One was taken by Mexico to the NAFTA for resolution 
(cross-border trucking) and the other by the US to the WTO for resolution 
(telecommunications). The difference in the outcomes is striking. While Mexico began the 
process of complying with the decision of the WTO ruling on the telecom case, despite a 
clear decision of the NAFTA panel in Mexico’s favor in the trucking case in 2001, Mexico 
was unable to obtain compliance from the US to modify its practices on trucking for over a 
decade.  After the panel’s ruling, the US and Mexico agreed to a Cross-Border Trucking 
Services Demonstration Program which gave licenses to a select number of Mexican 
carriers to operate in the US under strict regulations. However, the US Congress withdrew 
funding for the Program on 11 March 2009. In response, 
                                                 
59 See 
Mexico imposed retaliatory tariffs 
amounting to $2.4 billion on a number of US agricultural and industrial goods on 16 March 
2009. Mexico later expanded the list of US items subject to punitive tariffs. On 3 March 2011, 
fully a decade after the NAFTA Panel had issued its report, US President Barack Obama 
and Mexican President Felipe Calderon announced  that the two parties had come to a 
resolution of this outstanding dispute and that they had reached a preliminary agreement 
aimed at resolving the bilateral dispute over access of Mexican trucking services to the US 
market. Once the final agreement on a new cross-border trucking program is concluded, 
Mexico will immediately lower by 50% the retaliatory tariffs it slapped on some US exports. 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_agreements_index_e.htm?id=A8#selected_agreement  
60 See Stephenson and Robert (2011). The authors wish to thank Alicia Nicholls, a research consultant at the 
Shridath Ramphal Centre for International Trade Law, Policy & Services at the University of the West Indies, 
Cave Hill Campus in Barbados for her research assistance on this issue. The only other dispute involving 
countries who are members to a regional trading arrangement is the complaint brought by Honduras against 
Nicaragua concerning measures affecting imports from Honduras and Colombia. However, this complaint was 
brought to the WTO in June 2000, before the Central American Integration System (SICA) had a regional 
services agreement in force. The regional agreement on services for Central America was brought into effect 
only after the countries of the region had negotiated and implemented the CAFTA-DR agreement. ADBI Working Paper 307                                                Stephenson and Robert 
  22 
The remaining 50% of the value of the tariffs will be suspended when the first Mexican 
operator is expected to receive operating authority under the new program.  
While it is difficult to know in the above-mentioned cases whether it is the robustness of the 
dispute settlement process, or the willingness of the parties involved to comply with the 
Panel decision, or a combination of both that made the difference, it may have implications 
for countries who have the choice of a forum for settling their grievances in the services area 
in a reluctance to choose an RTA dispute settlement process over the WTO process.
61 One 
interesting development regarding WTO dispute rulings on services is the evidence of new 
restrictions included in new RTAs as a result of these rulings. For example, the US-Republic 
of Korea FTA included a letter annexed to the chapter on cross-border trade in services 
where both parties state that the cross-border trade in gambling and betting services is not 
subject to Chapter Twelve (Cross-Border Trade in Services) and investment in gambling and 
betting services is not subject to Chapter Eleven (Investment).
62
In general, the WTO has been unable to bring a substantial oversight to the proliferation of 
RTAs and in consequence their compliance with the provisions of Article V of the GATS has 
not been evaluated in a significant manner. Not one official opinion exists on the 
compatibility of an RTA with Article V. The WTO Committee on Regional Trade Agreements 
has not been able to apply the criteria of Article V in a rigorous manner, as these need 
further precision and WTO members have not agreed on the definition of “substantially all 
services trade” as defined in terms of number of sectors, volume of trade and modes of 
supply.  Those RTAs concluded between developing countries fall under the lax or non-
existent disciplines of the Enabling Clause and have either not been notified or not been 
examined in any detail.  
 
There has not been a comprehensive reporting to the WTO of all the agreements negotiated 
on services. As mentioned earlier, 95 RTAs have been notified to the WTO under Article V 
as of June 2011. This is not, however, representative of all of the RTAs that have been 
concluded on services. The WTO Secretariat writes that this information is not exhaustive 
since it is impossible to account accurately for non-notified RTAs where information is scarce 
or inconclusive.
63
i)  Negotiate voluntary best-practice guidelines for new RTAs and 
modifications of existing ones; 
 The WTO has recently adopted a text with some modest strengthening of 
rules for Article V but these will not significantly change the way in which RTAs are treated 
under the WTO, which has been very lax. With the ever-expanding number of RTAs being 
negotiated around the world, this concern has been accentuated. Fears have been raised 
that the WTO will reduce its  relevance if it does not adjust to the rise of regionalism. 
Suggestions have been made by prominent trade economists recently to “multilateralize 
regionalism” through the following suggestions: 
ii)  Negotiate a hierarchy of best practice guidelines for North-North, 
North-South, and South-South RTAs; 
iii)  Negotiate a level of RTA discipline in between that of Article V and the 
Enabling Clause; and 
iv)  Establish WTO advisory services and/or a Centre on RTAs for 
developing countries.
64
                                                 
61Despite the willingness to bring disputes on services to the WTO for resolution, the credibility of the WTO has 
recently been severely affected because of the lack of its ability to enforce the panel and appellate body’s 
decision on cross-border gambling in the complaint brought by Antigua and Barbuda against the US and the 
subsequent withdrawal of the commitments in this area by the US. However, this case is not representative of the 
general outcome of service disputes brought to the WTO where most panel decisions have been respected.  
 
62 See http://www.sice.oas.org/TPD/USA_KOR/Draft_text_0607_e/asset_upload_file993_12732.pdf  
63 See WTO website http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm where up-to-date information on 
RTAs currently in force can be found in the summary tables of the WTO RTA Database. See also Crawford and 
Fiorentino (2005). 
64 See Baldwin and Thornton (2008), and Dadush (2010). ADBI Working Paper 307                                                Stephenson and Robert 
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Increasingly, trade experts emphasize that since regionalism is here to stay, the solution to 
the governance problem must be to work with it, not against it, and try to encourage regional 
agreements to converge or harmonize their approach through concerted WTO intervention. 
3.3  Innovating on reforms: are RTAs helping to move forward 
reforms in the services area?  
Answer: Yes and No. RTAs have improved upon the multilateral GATS regime in some ways 
and not in others. Many RTAs have disciplines on government procurement that cover both 
goods and services. In fact, all of the RTAs negotiated by the US contain this discipline as 
do the majority of those negotiated by the EU, Japan, Chile, Mexico, and Singapore.
65 
Government procurement rules for services have yet to be written at the WTO and the 
Government Procurement Agreement is still applied on a plurilateral basis only, with very 
few developing country adherents. However, RTAs have not been able to develop rules for 
emergency safeguards where only two RTAs contain such provisions and which have not 
been used to present.
66 Neither is this the case for subsidies where disciplines have been 
included in only a couple of RTAs among developed countries (the EU and ANZCERTA) and 
with no progress in the GATS. In the area of domestic regulation some RTAs reproduce the 
GATS language of Article VI but do not go further.
67
However, RTAs have some disciplines that are lacking in the GATS. Many RTAs have 
included chapters on competition policy, electronic commerce and intellectual property rights 
that apply to both goods and services. Some recent RTAs include separate chapters on 
transparency with much stricter provisions that also apply to services. Importantly, a large 
number of RTAs include comprehensive disciplines on investment that cover both goods and 
services and that provide for market access for investors as well as guarantees for the 
treatment of investors and their investments. Some RTAs have also gone further in the area 
of temporary movement, particularly a few recent North-South RTAs that have added new 
categories of workers. Canada has negotiated recent FTAs with Colombia and Peru that go 
quite far in covering all professional categories with no numerical limits and also expand 
coverage of worker categories beyond professionals to include “technicians.” In Asia RTA 
members have also experimented with relaxation of categories of workers such as the 
inclusion of nurses and health practitioners in agreements between Japan and the 
Philippines and Indonesia, or PRC massage therapists in the RTA between Australia and the 
PRC. The EU has included categories of independent service suppliers and graduate 
trainees in its only completed Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with CARIFORUM 
without numerical limits. 
 
With few exceptions, RTAs have not been able to push countries to liberalize their service 
sectors at a faster pace than they would otherwise do this on their own. It has been on the 
whole the case that the sequencing of reforms in the services area has been the same 
whether at the multilateral or regional level, with governments preferring for a variety of 
reasons to undertake reforms domestically first and then commit these within trade 
agreements when appropriate. So RTAs have not generally been the instruments through 
which governments have first committed to liberalization and then subsequently undertaken 
reforms. The nature of domestic political economy forces are such that agreement on 
regulatory reforms cannot easily be undertaken in the context of an international negotiation 
but must be agreed through trade-offs at the national level. Nonetheless, in several 
instances this has happened at the regional level whereas this has only happened in the 
                                                 
65 See VanGrasstek (2011). The author emphasizes the use of RTAs as precedent setters and this is particularly 
the case in the area of government procurement. 
66 See Mattoo and Sauvé (2010). 
67 See VanGrasstek (2011). ADBI Working Paper 307                                                Stephenson and Robert 
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WTO in the telecoms area and for specific reasons that are unique to the historical context of 
those negotiations.
68
RTAs can really only discriminate between service suppliers at the border, for example 
through differentiating in the percentage of equity allowed for foreign investors or the 
numbers of foreign workers granted entry as between various suppliers. But once the 
services are inside the border, the regulations are applied in the same way to all service 
suppliers, foreign or domestic. In this way, RTAs in services are much less discriminatory 
arrangements than might be imagined, since many of the restrictions on services trade are 
“behind-the-border” impediments. Thus, once the decision is made to undertake regulatory 
reform at the national level, the subsequent reforms are applied to all on an MFN basis. 
Many policy analysts underscore the need to implement these reforms as quickly as possible 
to get the benefits of increased competition since infant industry protection in services has 
not been shown to bring any benefits.
 
69
Some RTAs also include provisions that make them effectively “dynamic” instruments with 
respect to ongoing services liberalization. This is the case of those agreements containing a 
“ratchet clause” or an in-built provision for automatic future liberalization providing for the 
binding application to other RTA partners of all measures that are liberalized and brought 
into effect after the entry into force of the agreement. This provision means that effectively 
parties to RTAs can only move toward greater openness, and that this cannot be reversed 
under the agreement. Other RTAs contain a requirement for undertaking periodic review and 
negotiations for further market access opening. NAFTA-type RTAs often include a Review 
Clause of this nature. 
 
3.4  Fostering services trade: have RTAs impeded the expansion of 
services trade? 
Answer:  Cautious  No. This question is difficult to answer without undertaking empirical 
studies on the impact of RTAs on service trade flows. However, a recent study by 
Stephenson and Robert (2011) that carried out calculations on this variable has shown that 
for those RTAs with an adequate data set for examination, RTAs have fostered services 
trade.
70 The study used a simple methodology to calculate “excess growth” for certain RTAs 
entered into by countries in the Americas. This methodology attempts to capture how trade 
in services has evolved after the entry into force of some key RTAs based on a comparison 
of the performance of services trade between the same partners and prior to the 
agreements.
71
Applying the “excess growth” methodology to four different RTAs involving countries of the 
Americas for which it was possible to gather reliable datasets
 It is explained in the Annex. 
72
                                                 
68 See Robert and Stephenson (2008). Costa Rica agreed to liberalize both its telecom and financial services 
sectors as a result of the conclusion of the CAFTA-DR with the US. Mexico agreed to liberalize its financial 
services sector as the result of the NAFTA and Chile did likewise as a result of the US-Chile FTA. These 
market opening measures have subsequently been applied to all service providers, not just the RTA partner. 
 shows that for these 
69 This opinion was expressed by Hamid Mamdouh, the Director of the WTO Services Division, during the 
discussion at the PECC-ADBI Conference on “Services Trade: New Approaches for the 21
st Century,” Hong 
Kong, China; June 2011. 
70 Ideally, the best way to examine the effect of FTAs is with gravity models (for services trade, goods trade, and 
foreign direct investment), but the data and computational requirements of such exercises are beyond the scope 
of this paper.  
71 The results reported in this section are drawn from a study by Stephenson and Robert (2011), who recognize 
with gratitude the original contribution of Thibaud Delourme in developing the statistical approach for this 
methodology and applying it to the regional groupings to obtain the results reported in this section for services 
trade and goods trade.  
72 Although we examined the “excess growth” trends for NAFTA, the results were not felt to be accurate enough 
to warrant inclusion in the discussion as it was not possible to carry out the calculations in the same manner as 
for the other agreements given the limitations in the data sets. As NAFTA was concluded some time ago, there ADBI Working Paper 307                                                Stephenson and Robert 
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agreements, “excess growth” in services (between partner countries) is shown to increase 
after the RTA entered into force, in some cases significantly. And for members of three out 
of four agreements, the differential in “excess growth” is shown to increase more for services 
than for goods, indicating that the impact of the agreement on stimulating growth in services 
trade has been greater after its entry into force than its impact in stimulating growth in goods 
trade. This is the case for the US-Chile RTA where growth in services trade accelerated 
more between the two trading partners after the RTA than with the rest of the world during 
the five years following the RTA (2004–2009), resulting in an “excess growth” of 3.11% for 
the US and Chile combined, indicating that for both countries, trade in services has grown at 
a faster rate than that with other countries, in  contrast to the earlier period prior to the 
agreement (2000–2004). This is likewise true for the US-Singapore RTA where “excess 
growth” in services rose from -2.48% during the five years prior to the RTA (2000-2004) to 
0.94% during the five years following the agreement (2004–2009). The RTA between Mexico 
and Japan (2005) is also associated with a significant increase in “excess growth” of trade in 
services, rising from -13.79% during the five years before the FTA (2000–2005) to 8.54% 
during the four years following the agreement (2005–2008). Lastly, in the case of the more 
recent CARIFORUM-EC EPA, the “excess growth” for services for the EU and CARIFORUM 
countries combined rose from -4.96% over the period prior to the agreement (2000–2008) to 
7.64% after the agreement (2007–2009). The latter two RTAs show a particularly strong 
stimulus to services trade.  
Thus, although causality is difficult to prove, the “excess growth” calculations show that for 
those RTAs with an adequate dataset to merit an examination of trends prior to and 
subsequent to the entry into force of an agreement, services trade has increased more 
between RTA partners than it has with the rest of the world. However, growth in services 
trade was also shown to be positive between the RTA members and the rest of the world, 
indicating that the agreements have not had a negative impact on other trading partners.  
Two other factors have contributed to RTAs being less discriminatory in the services area 
than is the case of RTAs for goods, making them more stimulating to services trade globally. 
Many commitments on services under RTAs involve changes to the regulatory regimes that 
cannot be applied on a discriminatory basis and are subsequently granted on an MFN 
basis.
73
The design of the rules of origin (ROO) provisions for services in RTAs has also contributed 
to the ability of these agreements to foster services trade. Most RTAs opt for liberal rules of 
origin extending the benefits of the trade agreement to all third country investors as long as 
they are established in an RTA territory and engage in substantial business operations. In so 
doing, they do not discriminate by nationality of the suppliers. Thus a firm from any third 
country established in the territory of an RTA member that conducts substantial business 
operations and is not a paper company is eligible to conduct cross-border trade and to 
benefit from the RTA if it is commercially established in the country. Trade experts have 
opined that because of the liberal construction of the ROO provision in most RTAs, the 
discriminatory wedge they create is minimal.
 This was the case of Mexico and its liberalization of banking services under the 
NAFTA, as well as the case of Costa Rica and its liberalization of insurance and certain 
telecom services under the CAFTA-DR. Applying  liberalization on an MFN basis often 
proves to be the more economically efficient course of action in the services area.  
74
                                                                                                                                                  
are no time series on services trade available for Mexico and Canada for the years prior to the agreement. For 
more details on the application of this methodology and its results, see the study by Stephenson and Robert 
(2011). 
  
73 See VanGrasstek (2011). 
74 See Beviglia-Zampetti and Sauvé (2006). ADBI Working Paper 307                                                Stephenson and Robert 
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4.  CONCLUSION 
On the whole, the panorama of considerations discussed above indicates that the interaction 
between the RTAs and the WTO system shows a mixed picture with respect to governance. 
While the economic effects of the RTAs and their provisions do not seem to be unfriendly to 
the GATS and have not impeded the growth of services trade on the part of the RTAs 
examined, nonetheless this outcome depends very much on the quality of the agreement 
concerned—the extent of its sectoral coverage and the depth of its disciplines. Many current 
RTAs may fail to meet the more stringent criteria for deep integration. When the 
commitments made under RTAs are subsequently applied on an MFN basis, this is the best 
possible outcome for combining the benefits of regionalism with the multilateral system. 
RTAs have been testing grounds for moving forward some disciplines in the services area 
but not others. In terms of WTO compliance, the WTO is currently lacking in ability to 
effectively survey and evaluate RTAs with respect to their compliance with the criteria of 
GATS Article V. On the other hand, RTA members do not seem to be settling services 
disputes in the regional context and have therefore not created any alternative jurisprudence 
that might come into potential conflict with WTO rules. 
However, the sheer number of RTAs being concluded and their diversity do represent a 
potential weakening of governance at the multilateral level. Regionalism has provided a 
significant alternative architecture for governing services trade in the form of the negative list 
approach which differs in many fundamental respects from the GATS and is finding an 
increasing number of adherents around the world.  
The issues discussed above call attention to the need for the WTO to focus its attention on 
RTAs to try and ensure that  they are truly “multilaterally friendly”. This is particularly 
important in light of the stalemate of the Doha Round and its possible future abandonment. 
The WTO needs to have both strengthened oversight of the diverse universe of RTAs as 
well as greater flexibility in order to allow for the incorporation of some of the innovative 
elements in RTAs into the GATS in the form of sectoral or plurilateral agreements that can 
push the envelope of services liberalization further along among smaller groups of like-
minded countries.  
Such plurilateral agreements could either focus on specific sectors or could constitute 
agreements by type of discipline. For example, an agreement among WTO members to bind 
all cross-border trade in services (modes 1 and 2) would be a very useful step, particularly 
for developing members. An agreement on a package for commercial presence (mode 3) 
would also be very significant, such as the binding of applied regimes on foreign direct 
investment (with limited sectoral exceptions) or agreement on the binding of a certain 
percentage of sectors within a mode 3 package. A plurilateral approach to moving forward 
services trade liberalization must be put on the table if the WTO is to regain its relevance in 
the services area. An open-ended group of ‘like minded countries’ could act as the 
equivalent of “pathfinders” to move forward with such initiatives. Any resulting plurilateral 
agreement should, of course, be open to acceptance by any WTO member willing to sign on 
when it is able to do so. 
Experimentation with the governance of services trade has become the exclusive purview of 
RTAs only over the past decade. In order not to fall into irrelevance, it will be very important 
for the WTO to join in the ongoing dynamism of shaping rules and negotiating modalities that 
reflect the changing character of services trade and regulations. Otherwise its governance 
structure will fail to provide the overarching umbrella within which the RTAs should operate 
in a multilaterally-friendly manner. ADBI Working Paper 307                                                Stephenson and Robert 
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ANNEX 
  “Excess Growth Methodology” 
The “excess growth” methodology measures the growth in trade in services between the 
members of an FTA as compared with the growth of trade in services with non-members of 
the FTA. Calculations of total trade include imports and exports.  Data  are drawn from 
international (OECD and IMF Balance of Payments) and national sources (USTR Dataset 
and Eurostat) to obtain statistics on trade in services by trading partner. Calculations are 
carried out for: (a) the average growth in total trade in services between a member of a given 
FTA and the other members, which is labeled intra-zone trade; and (b) the average growth in 
total trade in services between that same member and the rest of the world, excluding other 
members, or the extra-zone trade. By subtracting the growth in extra-zone trade from the 
growth in intra-zone trade, i.e. (a) – (b), it is possible to obtain a measure of “excess growth” 
which indicates  whether trade in services between a member of a FTA and the other 
members has grown faster (positive excess growth) or slower (negative excess growth) than 
trade with non-members. This “excess growth” is then calculated for every member. The 
“total excess growth” is calculated for the regional grouping as a whole by subtracting the 
growth of total extra-zone trade from the growth of total intra-zone trade. These calculations 
are carried out for two periods: before and after the agreement enters into force in order to 
observe the performance of services trade and test whether the existence of an FTA might 
be a factor in accelerating the growth of intra-zone trade relative to the growth of extra-zone 
trade or not. Expectation is for the “excess growth” in services trade of the members of a 
FTA involving services liberalization to be higher after the agreement enters into force than it 
was prior to the agreement. Results are also shown for the Δ Growth, which is simply the 
differential in excess growth after and before the FTA: Δ Growth = Excess growth after the 
agreement minus Excess Growth before the agreement.  
The time frames for calculating the “excess growth” figures have been chosen in function of 
the longest time period of available and comparable statistics for services trade for the 
parties to an agreement. The years studied were symmetrical, that is an attempt was made 
to cover the same number of years prior to and after the agreement.  